

Handout 2

Reason and moral intuition: Haidt

DUMBFOUNDING. Suppose that you learn of two adult siblings engaging in consensual sex. Although you're told that no harmful consequences can possibly ensue, your reaction is (presumably) a strong aversion with normative statements such as, 'This is wrong!' Importantly, you're unable to cite intelligible reasons for your reaction. At the same time, you are not prepared to give it up. Similar reactions are observed in other cases like chicken masturbation etc.

814.1

817.1

SOCIAL INTUITIONISM. Haidt uses this example of incest to provide some preliminary evidence for *social intuitionism*:

SI Moral judgement is, largely, a response akin to perception. It is also, intrinsically, a process in which you try to sway other people's opinions and to convert them to your point of view. Therefore: morality, largely, is a rhetorical instrument based on a non-rational cognitive mechanism.

814.2

The contrast between the rationalist and the SI models is illustrated in two figures. Examine Figure 2 and observe two features. The reasoning cited in support of a verbalised moral judgement is post hoc—that is, first the judgement is formed and pronounced, then the reasoning is given in its support. At least normally, we are not to believe that the rational argument *generates* the judgement and the behavioural response toward the given morally significant situation. This causal flow is of course reversed in the rationalist model. Secondly, the rhetorical element is completely missing in the rationalist model in Figure 1. As the rationalist sees it, the moral judge is like a scientist discovering moral truths. On the SI model, the moral judge is like a lawyer aiming to influence the audience. Influence how, to what end? The main purpose is to recruit others to your view. The moral judge aims to form moralistic alliances with the aid of a verbalised judgement in a rational wrapping.

815

Remark 1. Another way to put the alliance-building function of moral judgements (when publicly expressed which is their 'natural setting') is to understand them as signals to the audience about your moral stance with the view of joining extant alliances.

820.1

Remark 2. Compare what Haidt says about Kohlberg with Rawls' views (if you haven't covered our Kohlberg appendix yourself).

RATIONALISM AND INTERACTIONISM. The dispute with rationalism is clear enough. On one hand, there is the Kantian tradition in which moral principles must follow from the properties of rationality itself. On the other hand, there is Kohlberg and others like Rawls, on whose view (as we saw) moral development and the emergence of moral reasoning track the development of cognitive abilities.

816

A extension of Kohlberg's rationalism is the 'social interactionism' defended by Turiel. The emphasis is on a sharp distinction between conventional and non-conventional violations (echoing Kohlberg). Non-conventional violations are violations of the rules that are universal and unchangeable. They are criticised on the basis of their harmful consequences. Importantly, Turiel stressed the role of peer-to-peer interactions that contribute to the maturity of moral judgement.

817.1

Haidt endorses the social aspect of Turiel's view, but insists that the causal role of reasoning should be challenged. The evidence that Turiel assembled shows a *correlation* between judgement and reasons (such as reference to harms). But this is no proof that these reasons cause the judgement, rather than being caused by it.

INTUITION AND REASONING. A fundamental distinction of the SI model is the one between intuitions and reasoning. Reasoning is a conscious, effortful, and controllable activity. It is to be contrasted with intuitions that are quick and cheap, and whose process is not accessible to consciousness. As Haidt notes, a moral intuition so understood is similar to the traditional 18th century understanding of aesthetic judgement.

818.1

818.2

ELEMENTS OF THE SI MODEL. So far we have covered the Links 1–4 of the model described in 818–819. These elements, and in particular Links 1–2, represent the sharp contrast between SI and classical rationalism, as well as Turiel’s interactionism. But let us mention now that the SI model is flexible enough to accommodate some of the rationalist insights. Thus, in situations where there is no stable or strong intuition, as may be the case in novel, unfamiliar situations, people may resort to a rational examination (Link 5). However, this is not really a concession to the rationalist (see Example 3)

819.1

Example 3 (Cloning). Is cloning morally permissible? If you ask me out of the blue, I may not have an intuition one way or another. I might not have any emotional attitude to it. So I will defend my position by appealing to some general principles. Yet the kind of principles I adopt at the outset are likely to be shaped by intuitions. If I am emotionally inclined to favour equality, then one verdict will follow. If instead I favour perfection, then another. The social intuitionist should insist (I think) that there is no ground zero of moral discussion where I begin from scratch using only my reasoning abilities. On the contrary, my acceptance of ‘self-evident’ rational principles masks my prior emotional attitudes.

Another hidden problem for the rationalist: it matters *who* defends which view in the debate. Supposing I have no view on the matter, if on a public occasion my friend suggests permitting cloning, I may produce arguments in favour not so much *because* I believe they are right, but because I want to support my friend’s position. The opposite happens if the speaker is my enemy.

821.1

Remark 4. An even more telling example would be a political event that demands some moral evaluation, like the war in Ukraine.

There may be occasions when I examine a moral issue in private (Link 6). Then it is possible to either fall back on your dominant intuition or to use reasoning. The latter is likely, e.g., with moral philosophers who are supposed to follow wherever their reason leads them to. But again, though Haidt sounds ecumenical, we may doubt such possibilities. For example, a rational(ist) philosopher can’t examine just every kind of argument in favour or against *P*. He’ll have to be selective. But his selection will be much affected by his intuitions, emotional attitudes, elements of the social context.

819.1

LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS. Psychologists and cognitive scientists have proposed a dual-process model of cognition. The affective process is quick and easy. The reasoning system is effortful and slow (see Table 1). The social intuitionist insists that moral judgement is primarily a product of the affective process. Once again, we see it as part of a public debate, rather than a private reflection. In the debate it matters *who* said what, rather than who said *what*. In a conversation among friends, for example, there will be a pressure to come to some agreement. But in a conversation among enemies or rivals, the pressure will be in the opposite direction. Neither of these pressures have anything to do with discovering moral truths or constructing logically more adequate arguments.

819.2

There are other similar pressures. Consider, e.g., the coherence pressure to form beliefs consistent with your extant ones. Or consider terror management which forces you to stick to your cultural norms more tightly. Your moral judgement then tracks this psychologically induced commitment.

821.1

821.2

Question 5. Reflect on different ways in which we experience terror: in the face of a terror attack or natural disaster. Think of typical responses.

There *may* be a situation where the subject arrives at a moral judgement ‘objectively’ and rationally. If you have enough motivation, time, ability, no emotional involvement, no personal stake like reputation—why, you may then engage in a lengthy and rational discussion. Clearly, this won’t happen often, if ever! The default employment mode for your moral judgement is that of a lawyer, not a scientist.

822.1

A FACTORY OF POST-HOC EXPLANATIONS. In most situations, our moral judgements are produced by intuitions. Here, it is useful to invoke the dual-process model of the mind. In different areas of psychology researchers came to recognise two modules of the mind. Your ‘intuitive’, ‘hot’ module is fast, efficient, and opaque. We don’t have conscious access to the way we come to form intuitive responses. Your ‘rational’, ‘cool’ module is slow, inefficient, and transparent. We can readily examine how you establish your reasoned conclusions. Moral judgements, then, are for the most part a product of the fast module. Your moral reasoning is a handmaiden of intuitions.

822.1-2

Haidt’s important next move is to claim that people draw their justifications not from their introspective understanding of how they arrived at a moral judgement (this is opaque, as we just said), but from the available pool of cultural norms—that is, norms developed to assess the behaviour of

822.2

others. When people manufacture their moral justifications (=reasons for judging that ϕ -ing is morally good/bad), they in effect broadcast the norms of their respective cultures.

This post-hoc employment of reason creates two illusions, that moral judgement is driven by moral reasoning (in reality it is the other way round), and that we can influence other people's judgements merely by reasoning. A consequence of the second illusion is that the opponent's failure to be convinced by our rational arguments leads us to accuse him of being blind to reason, biased, driven by self-interest.

DEVELOPMENT AND PLASTICITY. How are intuitions generated? That is, how can a particular situation or a hypothetical scenario elicit a particular intuition? Haidt's answer, in a nutshell, is that there is an innate base of intuitions, and that this base is extended later through social interaction, in particular, through the use of metaphors (where 'metaphors' include all sorts of figurative speech and thinking). If through your innate base you are able to judge a situation X as good/bad, then I'll try to make you see another (in many regards different) situation Y as analogous to X and, therefore, also judge it good/bad.

What does the base consist of? The main idea is that we observe among the primates some apparently innate abilities to follow and enforce certain behavioural norms, like communal sharing, social hierarchy, and reciprocity. It is inconceivable that there human and primate development mechanism are totally dissimilar. Hence, we can postulate that certain moral intuitions, along the dimensions just mentioned, are given to us innately.

However, if our intuitions are rooted in the same base, what can explain their diversity among different individuals? Well, whereas primate societies are largely morally homogeneous, human societies are emphatically not. Plausibly, then, the innate base is modified by culture. Haidt here adopts Shweder's proposal that moral attitudes may be divided into three complexes: the ethic of autonomy, the ethic of community, and the ethic of divinity. Although a child is equipped with intuitions in all these ethics, different cultures stress some of them at the expense of other.

YSB