Ludwig
Wittgenstein

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

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With an introduction by Bertrand Russell

ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS

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1*	The world is all that is the case.	*Facts, not things. Why wouldn't a list of things do?*
1.1	The world is the totality of facts, not of things.	
1.11	The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.	
1.12	For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.	
1.13	The facts in logical space are the world.	
1.2	The world divides into facts.	
1.21	Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.	*Independence, said first of facts. It comes back at 2.061.*
2	What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.	*Fact, state of affairs, object: the three layers.*
2.01	A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).	

* The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. are comments on proposition no. n.m; and so on.

Its possibilities are written into the thing. Nothing here is accidental.

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.

If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is *no* object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the *possibility* of such combinations.

2.0122 Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all *possible* situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves, and in propositions.)

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

Knowing an object: all its possibilities.

(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

Nothing new to find later. Internal against external properties: the knight's moves.

A new possibility cannot be discovered later.

2.01231 If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties.

2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. *The objects fix every possible state of affairs.*

2.013 Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space. *A space of possibilities around each thing. Empty the space, but you can't remove it.*

2.0131 A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place.)

A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have *some* pitch, objects of the sense of touch *some* degree of hardness, and so on. *The speck and colour-space. An illustration only: we aren't told a speck is an object.*

2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all situations.

2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object. *The name for that possibility: form.*

2.02 Objects are simple. *Simple objects. A statement about a complex breaks down, as with the teapot.*

2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. *Here objects become the world's substance.*

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. *The substance argument: sense would hang on another proposition's truth.*

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). *The disputed step: no picture at all.*

2.022 It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something*—a form—in common with it. *Any imagined world shares a form with ours. Objects make up that form, one stock for every world.*

2.023 Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

2.0232 In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.

2.0233 If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different.

2.02331 Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them.

For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would be distinguished after all.

Whatever is the case, substance stays.

2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.025 It is form and content.

2.0251 Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.

2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form.

2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

What persists and what changes: objects against their configuration.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.

2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.

2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.

2.033 Form is the possibility of structure.

2.034 The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.

2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

2.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.

Reality as what exists and what doesn't: the combinations truth-functions mirror.

2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)

Independence, the claim that makes trouble. Try two shades at one point.

2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.

2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.

2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world.

Pictures enter here: a model of reality whose elements stand for objects.

2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.

2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

2.12 A picture is a model of reality.

2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

The sentence is a fact too: words standing in a determinate relation.

3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.

A propositional sign is a fact.

3.141 A proposition is not a blend of words.—(Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.)

A proposition is articulate.

A list of names says nothing: John, loves, Mary. It takes a fact.

3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.

3.143 Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing or print.

For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word.

(That is what made it possible for Frege to call a proposition a composite name.)

Furniture for words: the layout says it.

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.

Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

The claim most often read backwards. A fact about the names does the saying.

3.1432 Instead of, 'The complex sign "*aRb*" says that *a* stands to *b* in the relation *R*', we ought to put, '*That* "*a*" stands to "*b*" in a certain relation says *that aRb*.'

3.144 Situations can be described but not *given names*.

(Names are like points; propositions like arrows—they have sense.)

Simple signs and complete analysis. The twin, in language, of simple objects.

3.2 In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.

3.201 I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition 'completely analysed'.

3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. *Names are the simple signs. A name's meaning is the object itself.*

3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('*A*' is the same sign as '*A*'.)

3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign. *Configuration matches configuration. All three of Child's readings accept this.*

3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object. *A name stands in for its object.*

3.221 Objects can only be *named*. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*. Propositions can only say *how* things are, not *what* they are. *Naming against saying: how a thing is, never what it is.*

3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate. *The second argument for simples. Determinate here means specific, not precise.*

3.24 A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a constituent of the complex.

A complex can be given only by its description, which will be right or wrong. A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not exist, but simply false. *No complex, so false and not nonsense: the answer for Vulcan.*

When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such cases we *know* that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for generality *contains* a prototype.) *A sign for a complex gives itself away by what it leaves open. Inflation, Plato.*

The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in a definition.

3.25 A proposition has one and only one complete analysis. *One complete analysis only. Set against the chessboard's three divisions.*

3.251 What a proposition expresses it expresses in a

determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate.

Names are primitive: no definition takes one apart.

3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

3.261 Every sign that has a definition signifies *via* the signs that serve to define it; and the definitions point the way.

Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other is defined by means of primitive signs. Names *cannot* be anatomized by means of definitions.

(Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.)

3.262 What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their application says clearly.

Elucidations explain a name only to someone who already knows it. Is the circle vicious?

3.263 The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.

3.3 Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.

3.31 I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol).

(A proposition is itself an expression.)

Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression.

An expression is the mark of a form and a content.

3.311 An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions.

3.312 It is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes.